On the day that it is being reported that Robert Spitzer has disavowed his own study supporting ex-gay therapy, here is an edited excerpt from my article "The Case Against Reorientation Treatment" (2005) critiquing his much quoted study:
Because Spitzer’s research is cherished by the pro-reorientation camp as the one true work of science that supports their views, I have taken the trouble to go through it with a fine tooth comb. In his introduction Spitzer mentions the standard claims of bias against reorientation. He insists that, contrary to common belief, research in support of the efficacy of reparative therapy does exist, and then proceeds to cite all the pseudo-scientific research mentioned earlier in this article. His research doesn’t avoid the usual methodological pitfalls. He tells us of “Announcements aimed at recruiting participants [that] requested individuals who had sustained some change in homosexual orientation for at least 5 years.” So not only were they self-selected, but all those for whom re-orientation had failed had been sifted out in advance. They were poorly defined: they had to be “predominantly homosexual” (self-report, scored on a scale of 0-100) and to have experienced a change (in the direction of heterosexuality) of at least 10 points on the scale.
And a few more interesting facts: “These criteria were designed to identify individuals who reported at least some minimal change in sexual attraction, not merely a change in overt homosexual behavior or self-identity as “gay” or “straight.” It should be noted that individuals who satisfied these criteria were not excluded from the study if they had had homosexual sex during or following therapy.” If the individual is still having homosexual sex then what exactly constitutes “success”? “Forty-three percent of the 200 participants learned about the study from ex-gay religious ministries and 23% from the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality”. The rest were either recruited by their therapists or by other participants. The type of therapy participants received was not standardised and therefore varied wildly from psychological to pastoral counselling. Major methodological flaws are the recruitment of people who may be motivated towards self-deception (e.g. from ex-gay religious ministries) or even towards giving false information (out of a misguided sense of loyalty towards those who had tried to help them and who were also the ones urging them to participate in the study) and the lack of objective corroboration of the claims that have led to their selection in the first place.
“On all measures, the year prior to the therapy was compared to the year before the interview” – again, we see usage of the unreliable retrospective self-assessment. Spitzer admits that “Reports of complete change were uncommon”. An insightful statement of his encapsulates many of the psychological mechanisms that give rise to the dismissal of the subjective techniques used in such research: “Are the participants’ self-reports of change, by-and large, credible or are they biased because of self-deception, exaggeration, or even lying? This critical issue deserves careful examination in light of the participants’ and their spouses’ high motivation to provide data supporting the value of efforts to change sexual orientation.” This is immediately followed by: “Again, it is impossible to be sure, but comparing the actual results to the results that might be expected if such systematic bias were present suggests (at least to the author) that, by and-large, this is not the case.” This, of course is pure speculation based on nothing more than a hunch. He suggests that the presence of a bias would lead to a much higher reported change of sexual orientation. And why exactly is that? Is bias equally distributed? You can’t determine or even estimate the effect of an unmeasured factor.
He concludes: “Thus, there is evidence that change in sexual orientation following some form of reparative therapy does occur in some gay men and lesbians.” It is important to note that “To recruit the 200 participants, it was necessary to repeatedly send notices of the study over a 16-month period to a large number of participants who had undergone some form of reparative therapy. This suggests that the marked change in sexual orientation reported by almost all of the study subjects may be a rare or uncommon outcome of reparative therapy.” And: “The participants in the study all believed that the changes they experienced were due primarily to their therapy. However, the lack of a control group leaves the issue of causality open.”
Because there is no proof of causality, we cannot attribute any of the changes to the treatment. Any change reported could be the result of the strong Christian beliefs of individual participants, or other factors that had not been taken into consideration. Even the most enthusiastic, anxious-to-convert population is likely to return to homosexuality after some time, and only in a small number of cases did participants actually report maintaining heterosexual orientation over time. It is impossible to confirm that even those reporting heterosexuality had in fact changed their orientation or even their behaviour. It is impossible not to wonder why those approached were so reluctant to participate. You would expect someone who had undergone a “cure” of any kind to be enthusiastic about it and to want to “spread the word” through helping with related research.
Spitzer then says: “It probably is the case that reparative therapy rarely, if ever, results in heterosexual arousal that is as intense as a person who never had same sex attractions. However, advocates of reparative therapy do not make that claim. One would not judge a psychosocial treatment for a sexual dysfunction as a failure if it did not result in sexual function indistinguishable from that of individuals who never had experienced such a disorder.” But homosexuality is not a “sexual dysfunction”. This has strong implications for reorientation treatment: what is the ethical justification for trying to destroy someone’s natural (and therefore strong) sexual desire and replacing it with something that is not quite the real thing? Why is it justified for a therapist to cause psychological damage to someone in this context but not in any other context? Homosexuality is not a sexual dysfunction (such as paedophilia or any other form of sexual non-consensual aggression) and as such, there is no justification for it to be treated in a similar way.
Spitzer claims that “The findings of this study have implications for clinical practice. First, it questions the current conventional view that desire for therapy to change sexual orientation is always succumbing to societal pressure and irrational internalized homophobia. For some individuals, changing sexual orientation can be a rational, self-directed goal.” On what evidence does he base that? This is not supported by any facts or valid data gathered in his research. He continues: “Second, it suggests that the mental health professionals should stop moving in the direction of banning therapy that has as a goal a change in sexual orientation. Many patients, provided with informed consent about the possibility that they will be disappointed if the therapy does not succeed, can make a rational choice to work toward developing their heterosexual potential and minimizing their unwanted homosexual attractions.” The APA and the many other bodies that oppose this therapy, do so after careful consideration and in order to protect the public from unethical treatment and likely psychological damage. But above all, it is difficult to comprehend what motivates someone to promote a treatment that has never been proven to be effective.